Case Study #5-2 of the Program: “Food Policy For Developing Countries: The Role Of Government In The Global Food System” by Cheng, Fuzhi
    
©Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
All rights reserved.  This case study may be reproduced for educational purposes without express permission but must include 
acknowledgement to Cornell University. No commercial use is permitted without permission. 
 
 
5‐2 
 
Income Disparity in 
China and Its Policy 
Implications 
By:   
Fuzhi Cheng 
 
 
 
CASE STUDY #5-2 OF THE PROGRAM: 
“FOOD POLICY FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES:  THE ROLE OF 
GOVERNMENT IN THE GLOBAL FOOD SYSTEM” 
2007 
 
 
 
Edited by: 
Per Pinstrup‐Andersen (globalfoodsystem@cornell.edu) and Fuzhi Cheng 
Cornell University 
 
In collaboration with: 
Søren E. Frandsen, FOI, University of Copenhagen 
Arie Kuyvenhoven, Wageningen University 
Joachim von Braun, International Food Policy Research Institute
Income Disparity in China and Its Policy Implications 
Cheng 
 
©Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
All rights reserved.  This case study may be reproduced for educational purposes without express permission but must include 
acknowledgement to Cornell University. No commercial use is permitted without permission. 
 
1
Executive Summary 
 
China’s economy has witnessed considerable 
achievements since economic reforms were initiated 
in 1978. Average overall gross domestic product 
(GDP) has grown approximately 9 percent annually 
during the past two decades. Coinciding with this 
rapid economic growth is a marked increase in 
income inequality. In recent years China has had 
alarmingly high income disparity levels and has 
become one of the countries with most unequal 
income distribution in the world. 
 
Rising income inequality is considered one of the 
effects of the economic reforms. The move from 
egalitarianism to more market-based income deter-
mination has created both winners and losers 
within China’s population. In urban areas, the 
restructuring of the state-owned enterprises and 
the development of a vibrant private industrial and 
service sector, with wages and employment deter-
mined entirely outside the old socialist labor 
bureaus, dramatically changed the returns to 
human capital and skill. This change led to highly 
unequal earnings and incomes among urban resi-
dents. In rural areas, the introduction of the 
household responsibility system and the establish-
ment of off-farm employment opportunities based 
on township and village enterprises generated great 
differences in income among farmers and the 
nonfarm rural population. 
 
Other policy measures implemented before and 
during the reform also contributed to income dis-
parity in China. First, the heavy-industry-oriented 
development strategy, which aimed at promoting 
industrial growth within cities, greatly suppressed 
the agriculture sector and created a large urban-
rural income gap. This gap was further widened 
during the reform period by a set of urban-biased 
fiscal and monetary policies. Second, a flawed 
sectoral and regional development policy has 
caused income disparity to rise among China’s 
provinces. Third, the household registration system 
that limits labor mobility has aggravated the 
impacts of both sectoral- and regional-biased poli-
cies on spatial income disparity. Finally, the lack of 
social security has worsened income distribution in 
both urban and rural areas. 
 
Large income disparities now exist between the 
urban and rural residents, between different 
regions, and among the urban and rural residents 
themselves.  Rising income disparity is a source of 
concern to the government because it causes wide-
spread discontent and social protest. For long-term 
economic prosperity, the country should find a 
way to balance the policy that “let a few people get 
rich first” and the classical beliefs in egalitarianism. 
Income disparity in China has many dimensions, 
and only when the country is capable of tackling all 
of them can it develop a sustainable basis for con-
tinuing economic growth. A number of policy 
options are envisioned that would provide solutions 
to the problem. 
 
Your assignment is to make policy recommenda-
tions to the Chinese government to help reduce 
income disparity in this country.      
 
Background 
 
Economic Growth and Income Inequality 
China’s economy has witnessed considerable 
achievements in the past two decades and has 
become the second-largest economy in the world 
after the United States (in terms of GDP at pur-
chasing power parity exchange rates). Starting in 
1978, the Government of China began a process of 
liberalizing agriculture, trade, investment, and 
financial markets. The decentralization of govern-
ment control and the creation of “special economic 
zones” to attract foreign investment led to consid-
erable industrial growth, especially in light indus-
tries that produce consumer goods along China’s 
coastal areas. Average overall GDP during the 
reform period grew approximately 9 percent 
annually, and the population living below the abso-
lute poverty line has kept declining (Figure 1).1 
China has met the Millennium Development Goal 
of reducing the 1990 poverty incidence by half 
many years ahead of the 2015 target date and has 
been the trendsetter in regional and global poverty 
reduction. 
 
 
                                                 
1 The absolute poverty line defined in Ravallion and Chen 
(2004) is 850 yuan (about US$102 at the current 
exchange rate) a year for rural areas and 1,200 yuan 
(US$145) a year for urban areas, both at 2002 prices.  
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Despite its progress, China’s economy suffers from 
a number of social and economic problems. One of 
these problems is income disparity, which has been 
on the rise during the past two decades (Figure 2). 
According to a recent World Bank study by 
Ravallion and Chen (2004), the Gini coefficient, 
which measures income inequality within the 
Chinese population, reached almost 0.45 in 2001, a 
level many scholars consider alarmingly high. 
 
 
Figure 1: GDP Growth and Poverty Rate in China (%) 
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Source: World Bank 2006; Ravallion and Chen 2004. 
 
 
Figure 2: National Gini Index of Income Disparity for China, 1981–2001 
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Note: The Gini index is a measure of income inequality within a population. It takes a value between zero, when everyone 
has the same income, and one, when one person has all the income. 
Source: Ravallion and Chen 2004. 
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Table 1: Income Shares of Different Income Groups in 2002 (percent) 
Income 
Group 
Income Share  
of Highest-Income Group 
Income Share  
of Lowest-Income Group 
National Urban Rural National Urban Rural 
1% 6.1 4.4 6.0    
5% 19.8 14.8 17.8 0.6 1.2 1.0 
10% 31.9 24.4 28.1 1.7 3.0 2.5 
25% 57.2 46.1 50.0 6.2 10.3 9.1 
50% 81.0 71.8 74.5    
Source: UNDP 2005. 
 
A survey conducted by the Economic Research 
Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences 
(as reported in the China Human Development 
Report [UNDP 2005]) reveals that in 2002 the top 
1 percent of the population with the highest income 
owned 6.1 percent of the total income of the 
society (Table 1). The top 5 percent controlled 
nearly 20 percent of total income, and the top 10 
percent controlled nearly 32 percent. In contrast, 
the poorest 5 percent earned 0.6 percent of the 
total, and the poorest 10 percent made less than 2 
percent. These findings mean that the income of 
the richest 5 percent of the Chinese population was 
33 times that of the poorest 5 percent, and the 
income of the richest 10 percent of residents was 
nearly 19 times that of the poorest 10 percent. 
 
From Egalitarianism to “Letting a Few 
People Get Rich First” 
Large income disparity in China has been a fairly 
recent phenomenon. For nearly three decades after 
the Communist regime started in 1949, income dis-
parity was suppressed within its socialist egalitarian 
system. To minimize income inequality, the 
government adopted various policies on income 
distribution and redistribution that carried distinc-
tive central planning and administrative features. In 
urban areas, factories, shops, and other means of 
production, as well as residential housing, were 
either state-owned or collectively owned. Workers’ 
wages were centrally planned and administered, 
with the central government setting unified wage 
standards and scales. In rural areas, land and all 
other means of production were owned by people’s 
communes and the production teams under them. 
The state monopolized the purchase and sale of key 
agricultural products, implementing an even income 
distribution system among members of production 
teams or communes. As egalitarianism gained 
increasing popularity, differences between high- and 
low-income populations diminished in China. 
According to estimates by the National Bureau of 
Statistics of China, at the end of the 1970s the Gini 
coefficient for income inequality among Chinese 
residents was only about 0.16 (UNDP 2005). 
 
Although egalitarianism had led to low income dis-
parity, many people believed that the system was 
neither efficient nor equitable and led to economic 
stagnation. Since 1978 the government has 
embarked on a new economic development policy 
that has allowed a small number of people to get 
rich first and used them to stimulate enthusiasm 
and initiative in the rest of the population.2 A 
major characteristic of the policy is that it explicitly 
recognizes the influence of entrepreneurial ability 
and human capital, acquired or natural, in deter-
mining economic returns. Welcomed by a large 
number of people, the policy quickly spread across 
the whole country. In urban areas, the reform of 
the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and the devel-
opment of a vibrant private industrial and service 
sector, with wage and employment determined 
entirely outside the old socialist labor bureaus, 
dramatically changed the returns to human capital 
and skill, leading to higher inequality of earnings 
and income. 
 
                                                 
2 This idea was first presented by former Chinese leader 
Deng Xiaoping, who called on the country to allow some 
regions and people to get rich first so they could help 
others to achieve common prosperity. 
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In rural areas, the household responsibility system 
(HRS) immediately permitted households to retain a 
greater share of the returns to their own labor and 
entrepreneurial talent in managing their farms. 
Liberalization of farm-related activities and the 
establishment of family-run businesses provided 
another potential avenue for households to earn 
more than their neighbors. The establishment of 
township and village enterprises (TVEs), and the 
development of off-farm opportunities more 
generally, also provided households with a way to 
earn a living off the farm, potentially generating 
greater differences in income between farmers and 
the nonfarm rural population (Benjamin et al. 
2005).3 As in the cities, rural industrialization and 
development provided rising returns to human 
capital and skills, leading to higher income 
inequality. 
 
Profiles of Income Inequality 
According to the neoclassical growth model, 
income convergence should occur as an economy 
grows—poor countries or regions tend to catch up 
with rich ones in terms of the level of per capita 
product or income. Although empirical findings 
from cross-country studies remain mixed, there is 
ample evidence for such convergence across 
regions within countries. The literature cites exam-
ples of the U.S. states, Japanese prefectures, and 
European regions and provides reasons that facili-
tate such convergence as relative homogeneity in 
technology, preferences, and institutions. Contrary 
to international experience, however, convergence 
in China has not been evident—somewhat puzzling 
given that market-oriented reforms are expected to 
facilitate resource flows that tend to equalize factor 
returns across sectors and regions. Large disparities 
still exist in various parts of China between urban 
and rural residents, between different regions, and 
among urban and rural residents themselves. 
 
The urban–rural gap. Income disparity between 
urban and rural residents has been considered the 
biggest contributor to overall income inequality in 
China (Chang 2002). The urban-rural income gap 
has widened at an increasing rate since 1978, and in 
                                                 
3 The impact of off-farm employment on rural income 
disparity in recent years is arguable. With a high percent-
age of the rural population now having access to off-
farm employment, wages have become an income-inequa-
lity-reducing factor of intrarural household inequality 
(Zhu and Luo 2006). 
2004 rural income in China was only about 30 
percent of urban income (Figure 3). Although most 
developing countries have a clear urban–rural 
income divide, urban-rural income inequality in 
China is much more serious than in other coun-
tries. This large income gap is the result of many 
factors, especially government policies that have 
been persistently urban biased. 
 
Regional inequality. Large income differences exist 
among China’s different regions, with residents in 
municipalities and provinces along the east coast 
earning much higher incomes than those in inland 
provinces. For example, per capita annual income in 
Shanghai (a coastal municipality) was 16,682.82 yuan 
in 2004, much higher than in provinces in north-
east, central, and western China, none of which had 
per capita incomes exceeding 10,000 yuan. 
Although interregional inequality in China is 
caused by a number of factors, the most important 
is location. Location matters because the coastal 
regions have a much better agricultural production 
environment. They are closer to foreign markets, 
especially Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan; 
have much better infrastructure and human 
resources; and have been favorably affected by 
government policies (such as the opening-up 
policy) during the economic reform period. 
 
Intraurban and intrarural inequality. In addition to 
spatial inequality, urban and rural dwellers also feel 
the income disparity among themselves. In 2001 
the Gini coefficients were 0.32 and 0.37 in urban 
and rural areas, respectively—an increase of 75 
percent and 48 percent over 1981 levels (Figure 4). 
Table 1 shows that income distribution was similarly 
skewed in both urban and rural areas. In 2002 the 
richest 1 percent of urban and rural residents 
earned about 4 percent and 6 percent of total 
urban and rural income; the richest 5 percent 
earned 15 percent and 18 percent, and the richest 10 
percent earned 24 percent and 28 percent. In con-
trast, the poorest 5 percent of urban and rural 
residents earned 1.2 percent and 1.0 percent of the 
total, and the poorest 10 percent earned 3.0 
percent and 2.5 percent. The income of the top 5 
percent of income earners in 2004 was 12 times 
greater than that of the bottom 5 percent in urban 
areas and nearly 18 times in rural areas. Intraurban 
and intrarural inequality is primarily due to policy 
measures, especially those implemented during the 
reform period, that have changed people’s income-
earning capacity and opportunities. 
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Figure 3: Per Capita Annual Income of Chinese Urban and Rural Residents, 1978–2004 (yuan) 
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Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, various years. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: Urban and Rural Gini Index of Income Disparity (%) 
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Source: China National Bureau of Statistics, various years. 
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Thus, by all counts, income disparity in China has 
reached high levels.4 Many economists are con-
cerned that large income disparity could be detri-
mental to economic growth (Thorbecke 2007), and 
such a concern also abounds among policy makers 
and researchers within China. As early as 1996, 
Angang Hu, an influential scholar in China, warned 
that further increases in income disparity may lead 
to China’s dissolution, as in the former Yugoslavia. 
Mainstream media like The People’s Daily have fre-
quently warned that further widening of income 
disparity may create serious social and political 
problems, generate nationalist conflicts, and nega-
tively influence China’s economic and social sta-
bility. Indeed, large income disparity has in recent 
years caused many social problems and been a 
serious challenge to the country’s sustainable 
growth. 
 
Policy Issues 
 
Policy Bias against Agriculture 
A prominent factor contributing to China’s income 
disparity is the heavy-industry-oriented develop-
ment strategy pursued vigorously by the govern-
ment during the pre-reform era. To accelerate the 
pace of industrialization in cities, the state extracted 
massive amounts of resources from agriculture, 
mainly through the suppression of agricultural 
prices and restrictions on labor mobility. Despite 
some efforts to move industry toward the less-
developed rural regions during the Great Leap 
Forward, the development strategy resulted in a 
large rural–urban income gap. Yang (2002) argues 
that the main mechanisms for enforcing this urban-
biased development strategy were a “trinity of 
institutions” including the unified procurement and 
sale of agricultural commodities, the people’s com-
munes, and the household registration system (the 
hukou system). 
 
Sectoral income differences declined in the begin-
ning years of reform, owing in large part to the 
successful rural reforms that quickly liberalized 
agricultural markets, increased commodity prices, 
and raised farmers’ earnings. But the decline was 
short-lived and was followed by a steady increase in 
rural-urban income disparity starting in the mid-
                                                 
4 According to UNDP (2005), of the 131 countries for 
which data are available, China ranks 90th in terms of the 
Gini coefficient for income distribution. Only 41 coun-
tries manifest higher income inequality than China. 
1980s. Government policy changes leading to 
reduced agricultural prices and rising fiscal and 
monetary transfers from the rural to the urban 
sector were important factors. These policy 
changes occurred during a time when the costs of 
living in cities were on the rise and the government 
was under substantial political pressure from the 
urban residents.5 
 
From a pure development perspective, one might 
expect the urban-rural gap in China to narrow 
when the heavy industry emphasis and the urban 
bias are gradually abandoned as reforms proceed. 
First, a declining support for the industrial sector 
along with a rising one for the agricultural sector, 
and the end of urban food and housing subsidies 
would potentially serve to reduce the heavy urban 
bias of government expenditure. Second, the elimi-
nation of controls on many agricultural com-
modities, including the mandatory procurement of 
grains, would improve urban–rural terms of trade. 
Finally, the relaxation of China’s residential registra-
tion system would encourage more labor migration 
from the countryside to cities, which would even-
tually equalize factor returns. But because reforms 
in China are taking effects only gradually, and more 
importantly, policy reversals sometimes occur, the 
extent to which these changes will matter for 
China’s income distribution remains unclear. 
 
Sectoral and Regional Development 
Strategy 
A flawed sectoral development strategy has created 
large income disparities among provinces in China 
(Lin and Liu 2005). Since China was founded in 
1949, the Great Leap Forward strategy had guided 
the development of capital-intensive heavy indus-
tries. For security reasons, many of these heavy 
industries were located in provinces in central and 
western China. The regional allocation of these 
high-priority industries was, however, inconsistent 
with the comparative advantage of those provinces, 
based on their factor endowments. Important 
factors for industrial production such as heavy 
equipment, financial and human capital, and 
advanced technology were non-existent. As a 
result, many enterprises in the high-priority indus-
tries were inefficient and required repeated 
government intervention to support and protect 
                                                 
5 In contrast, the large number and geographic disper-
sion of Chinese farmers made it difficult to organize and 
place collective pressure the government.   
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them.6 To maintain the functioning of these indus-
tries, the government depressed the prices of some 
natural resource–based inputs, which were pro-
duced in the areas where these industries were 
located. In theory, this practice is equivalent to a 
tax imposed on these regions. In the end, this 
strategy, instead of promoting industrialization, 
retarded the functions of the market, impeded 
capital accumulation, and hindered technology and 
productivity progress. 
 
A biased regional development policy during the 
reform period also contributed to the widening 
regional income disparities. The economic reform 
initiated in 1978 allowed some people and some 
regions to get rich first. The sixth and seventh five-
year plans (1981–1985, 1986–1990) strategically 
declared that more concentrated development 
efforts would be allocated to the most promising 
growth regions. Thus, many areas along China’s 
eastern coast enjoyed significant increases in 
investment, especially foreign direct investment. 
Increased investments in development in the coastal 
regions have yielded significant gains, but the 
expected spillover effects for the rest of the coun-
try have not been evident. Inland provinces con-
tinue to be affected by regional protection and 
market segmentation. Studies have confirmed that 
the central government’s policy of favoring invest-
ments in the eastern region has been the root 
cause of the lagging development and income in 
the central and western regions (see, for instance, 
Demurger et al. 2002; Fleisher and Chen 1997). In 
addition, these studies point out that unfavorable 
geographic conditions have also contributed to the 
lack of development in these regions. 
  
Restrictions on Labor Migration 
Sectorally and regionally biased policies would have 
limited impact on spatial income distribution if 
inputs were freely mobile across provinces or 
sectors. This is a standard implication of the neo-
classical growth model with diminishing-return 
technology in which factor movements tend to 
equalize input returns across geographic locations 
and industries. Unfortunately, restrictions and 
obstacles to factor mobility prevail in China despite 
                                                 
6 To ensure the survival of these enterprises, the 
government created a market system with distorted 
factor and product prices and a resource allocation 
mechanism under direct administrative planning (Lin and 
Liu 2005).  
progress with reform and the dominance of com-
petitive forces in the final goods markets. The 
result is a modern urban sector with a competitive 
pool of labor and a populous rural agricultural 
sector with a huge number of surplus workers, 
estimated at 150 million. Those working in the 
urban modern sectors receive incomes equal to 
their marginal revenue product, but those in the 
rural agricultural sectors receive only their sub-
sistence income as a result of their immobility. 
 
Chang (2002) compares a college graduate in 
Shanghai, who can easily receive several job offers 
paying him 7,000 yuan a month to start, with a 
rural peasant, who can make barely 300 yuan a 
month. He argues that the pay to the college grad-
uate is likely to increase, because as China further 
integrates with the world, its urban income will 
equalize with that in the rest of the world. The 
income of the rural peasant, however, is likely to 
remain at the subsistence level, because competition 
with other unskilled workers in the huge reservoir 
of surplus labor would make any increase in income 
impossible. There seems to be no easy way to 
reduce the income gap between the urban and rural 
sector as long as the unlimited labor supply in the 
latter sector cannot migrate out of it. 
 
Institutions and policies that obstruct factor 
movements across regions or between rural and 
urban areas include explicit regulations on labor 
mobility (for example, the hukou system), preferen-
tial employment opportunities for local residents, 
poor housing markets, pension and health care 
arrangements, and high costs of child care and 
education for migrant families. These institutional 
factors reinforce the effects of sectorally and 
regionally biased policies on spatial disparity. With-
out labor migration, the reduction of the spatial 
income gap would depend solely on the relative 
growth rates, or development, of industrial and 
service sectors in different locations. To the extent 
that such development is concentrated in coastal 
areas or in cities because of pre-existing or con-
tinuing bias, the spatial income disparity is likely to 
persist. 
 
Lack of Social Security 
The reform of China’s SOEs brought about prob-
lems related to social security that exacerbated 
income inequality within the cities. Before the 
reform, the SOEs relied on state funding to 
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provide social security to employees and their 
families. As the reform progressed, responsibility 
for providing social security gradually shifted to 
the SOEs, creating a substantial burden for these 
urban enterprises. In addition, the aging of the 
SOEs’ employees raised the dependency ratio of 
retired people to active workers, making the bur-
den even heavier. The government has attempted 
to reform the system by shifting responsibility for 
social security from the SOEs to the government 
through a new formal social security system. The 
implementation of these measures has been too 
slow, however, to keep up with the pace of reform. 
The result has been delayed payment or nonpay-
ment of pension benefits to some retirees and 
pensioners and a widening income gap between 
pensioners and others in the cities. 
 
Compared with urban areas, social security has 
been even more inadequate in rural areas. Before 
the reform, the main rural social security measures 
consisted of five guarantees (minimum guarantees 
for people unable to work and those with no 
income), health insurance (the Rural Cooperative 
Medical System, RCMS), and social relief for 
poverty caused by natural disasters. Most of these 
social security measures were of limited scale and 
were organized through people’s communes, which 
were the basis for agricultural production, adminis-
tration, and social services in rural areas. The 
majority of the rural households relied on self-help 
for social security purposes.  
 
The economic reforms moved the production base 
from the collectives to the household by initiating 
HRS. This reform led to the disbandment of the 
communes in the 1980s, which weakened social 
security functions in rural areas. For instance, the 
RCMS scheme was weakened in most of the rural 
communities after the 1980s, and health insurance 
coverage fell to 9.5 percent of the rural population 
in 1998 (Liu 2004). Recently, the government has 
begun to pay attention to social security in rural 
areas, but rural social security still lags far behind 
the reforms in urban areas. The pension insurance 
system instituted in the early 1990s in rural areas 
provides a mechanism for social security, but 
because it depends heavily on personal savings 
accumulation, the system is essentially of a self-
support nature. In sum, a private household in a 
rural area needs to take more responsibility for 
social security than a household in an urban area, 
and in rural areas the responsibility has become 
greater since the reforms. 
 
Stakeholders 
 
Rural Residents 
Economic reforms since 1978 have substantially 
improved the livelihoods of China’s rural residents. 
The HRS provided substantial incentives to farmers, 
who have boosted their incomes by engaging in 
specialized agricultural activities such as animal 
husbandry, horticulture, and aquaculture, in addi-
tion to raising traditional crops. Furthermore, the 
TVEs contributed to the bulk of increased wage 
income earned by the rural nonfarm residents. 
Despite these improvements, however, the rise in 
income of rural residents has been markedly small 
when compared with that of urban areas (see 
Figure 3).   
 
Rural residents are often deprived of in-kind subsi-
dies that are enjoyed by residents in cities. These 
urban-oriented subsidies include low-cost capital 
for urban enterprises, low-cost housing for urban 
residents, funding to urban primary and middle 
schools, and generous pensions, health insurance, 
unemployment insurance, and minimum living 
allowances for urban workers. Although some rural 
residents who work for county or township 
governments have employer-covered health insur-
ance, the quality and availability of medical person-
nel, clinics, and hospitals in urban areas far exceed 
those in rural areas. Therefore, if cash subsidies and 
other noncurrency benefits are taken into account, 
the welfare of rural residents lags significantly 
behind that of urban residents.  
 
There is also a large income disparity among rural 
residents themselves. The widening intrarural 
income inequality after the reform is mainly due to 
the dis-equalizing role of nonfarm income and the 
slow growth in agricultural income (Tsui 1998).7 As 
                                                 
7 According to household survey data collected in 2002 
by the Institute of Economics, Chinese Academy of 
Social Sciences (UNDP 2005), the wage income of rural 
households accounted for 29 percent of their total 
annual income. Because this income distribution was 
more unequal, its contribution to total income inequality 
was as high as 36 percent. In contrast, net  farming 
income accounted for 39 percent of farmers’ total 
income. But because the distribution of farming income 
was more equal, its contribution to total income inequal-
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more rural laborers move to nonfarm sectors—
either by finding employment in rural enterprises, 
starting their own businesses, or migrating to the 
urban industrial, construction, or service sectors—
the proportion of nonfarm income in rural income 
continues to rise.   
 
Urban Residents  
Income inequality in urban China began to increase 
in the mid-1980s, coinciding with the early stage of 
urban economic reforms. Various policy measures 
have had great impacts on the welfare of different 
urban residents. For instance, the government first 
implemented a policy of profit-sharing and decen-
tralization by allowing local governments and state-
owned enterprises to retain part of their revenues 
or profits. This measure created some successful 
enterprises that could pass profits to workers 
through bonuses and higher base wages, so that 
wage inequality rose across industrial sectors and 
across firms. It was also during this period of 
reform that food and housing subsidies were 
slashed. These important forms of in-kind income 
were likely very equally distributed, especially com-
pared with the straight wages that replaced them. 
 
The government subsequently reformed the state 
sector by privatizing small and medium-sized SOEs. 
Owing to the internal drive for more profits and 
external competitive pressures, many SOEs pursued 
structural reforms and resorted to cutting payrolls 
to improve efficiency. As a result, hundreds of 
thousands of urban workers were laid off. In addi-
tion, the SOEs tightened their pension programs, 
which negatively affected the retirees. Because of 
the lagging reform of the social security system, 
urban poverty loomed large. On the one hand, 
urban areas had booming economies and more 
opportunities to earn high incomes, especially for 
elite groups and the young generation who 
profited from their political and economic power 
and for a small number of people who took advan-
tage of loopholes in the system. On the other 
hand, incomes declined for the unemployed, the 
retired, and the laid-off workers. 
 
                                                                         
ity was just 27 percent. Therefore, the widening of rural 
income inequality is more closely linked to the develop-
ment of nonfarm activities in the rural economy. 
Residents in Different Regions 
Strict central planning and restrictions on migration 
between regions have created serious disparities in 
income among residents in different regions of 
China. The central government implemented a 
biased reform from the beginning by designating 
four cities in the coastal provinces of Guangdong 
and Fujian as “special economic zones” (SEZs). 
These SEZs acquired considerable autonomy, 
enjoyed superior tax treatment, and received pref-
erential resource allocations. Over time the policy 
was extended to all coastal regions, which conse-
quently saw rapid economic growth and a widening 
development gap with interior regions. Although 
many cities in the interior were opened in 1994, the 
time lag may have put the noncoastal provinces at a 
significant disadvantage for attracting investment 
and generating growth. 
 
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the coastal 
provinces attracted disproportionately high shares 
of domestic and foreign investments and interna-
tional trade and became the cradle of urban and 
rural enterprises, which have been the driving force 
behind China’s income growth. Comparing annual 
incomes in some high-income provinces such as 
Jiangsu and Guangdong, both of which are in the 
coastal region, with those in Ningxia, Zhejiang and 
Qinghai, which have the lowest income level in the 
western region, reveals an enormous difference. In 
2004 per capita annual income of Zhejiang 
(14,546.38 yuan), the richest province on the east 
coast, more than doubled that of Ningxia (7,217.87 
yuan), the poorest province in the west. In a study 
that examined income inequality by assessing the 
relative contribution of inland–coastal disparity and 
urban-rural disparity to overall regional inequality, 
Kanbur and Zhang (1999) point out that the former 
has been much more significant that the latter. It 
should be noted that the inland provinces in 
western China consist of 11 provinces and auton-
omous regions, accounting for 56 percent of 
China’s total surface area and 23 percent of its 
population. Residents in these provinces include 
most of China’s ethnic minorities. 
 
The Government 
The government’s development policy during the 
reform period set overall economic growth as the 
first priority, even if this goal sacrificed some 
equality of income distribution and opportunity. 
Some argue that the policy is justified by the 
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Pareto criterion because low-income people can 
also benefit from economic growth to some extent 
through spillover effects. Renard (2002) argues 
that the spillover effects can come from three 
sources: (1) demand-side externalities if investors in 
other provinces think they can sell their output to 
the province; (2) trade externalities because transac-
tion costs decrease as trade becomes more impor-
tant, so the growth of trade in the coastal 
provinces may benefit the inland provinces; and (3) 
supply-side externalities because of the diffusion of 
technological knowledge and managerial skills. In 
addition, the classical economic view holds that an 
increase in income disparity is normal at an early 
stage of a country’s economic development and 
that when the economy grows and per capita 
income reaches a certain minimum level, inequality 
will decrease.8 
 
However, a continued increase in income disparity 
could obstruct a nation’s economic growth. 
Thorbecke (2007) illustrates various channels 
through which inequality can lead to lowered 
economic growth. The detrimental effect of income 
disparity is more likely to occur in a country like 
China because of its cultural and ideological legacy 
of decades of socialism. Studies have shown that 
the Chinese population has low tolerance for 
income inequality. For example, China’s Gini 
coefficient for income distribution is close to that 
of the United States, but only 65 percent of 
Americans judge income inequality as too great, 
compared with 95 percent of Chinese (UNDP, 
2005). Although people’s subjective judgments 
about social equity may not be based on objective 
facts, these judgments can influence people’s 
behavior. In fact, in recent years the widening 
income gap between China’s rich and poor has 
been a leading cause of the country’s social 
problems, including rising crime rates in cities and 
frequent riots in rural and poor regions. The 
diffusion of political and social instability can lead 
to greater uncertainty and unproductive rent-
seeking activities which discourage investments and 
entrepreneurship and eventually chock growth. 
  
Thus, the government is facing a trade-off between 
efficiency gains from market-orient reforms and 
problems associated with worsening income 
                                                 
8 The theory originally developed by Kuznets (1955) 
states that economic inequality increases over time, then 
at a critical point begins to decrease. 
distribution. For long-term economic prosperity, 
the government should balance the policy of 
”letting a few people get rich first” and the classical 
beliefs in egalitarianism. It needs to determine an 
“optimal” degree of equality (or inequality) that 
would achieve the twin goal of fair society and the 
incentives and rewards required for growth. How-
ever this is not an easy task.  
 
Policy Options 
 
The rising income disparity in China is a source of 
concern to the government, as it causes widespread 
discontent and social protest. Chang (2002) argues 
that the disparity level is likely to remain high in 
the coming years and that there is no effective way 
to reduce the Gini coefficient or other inequality 
distribution measures in the short run. He points 
out, however, that increased urbanization will help 
alleviate income disparity in the long run. From a 
different perspective, Yang (2002) suggests that a 
gradual removal of sectoral and regional biases in 
institutions and policies would help reduce disparity 
in China. The following are policy options that the 
government can choose from.9 This list is not 
intended to be exhaustive; other options may exist 
that will provide equally good or even better 
solutions to the problem. 
 
Income Transfer 
If market mechanisms do not lead to more equality, 
the state could intervene through income transfer 
programs to help protect the poor against risk of 
fluctuations or shocks. The basic idea is fiscal feder-
alism, in which the central government takes 
responsibility for regional macroeconomic stabiliza-
tion (Renard 2002). Action can be taken through 
two channels. First, there can be a passive channel 
of interregional risk sharing with automatic fiscal 
stabilizers. In this case, an asymmetric shock 
induces automatic transfers between regions. 
                                                 
9 In recent years the Chinese government has 
implemented a series of policy measures that directly aim 
at reducing income disparity. These measures include 
elimination of taxes and fees for farmers, agricultural 
subsidies, rural infrastructure investment, a development 
strategy for western China, an urban Di Bao program (a 
program that provides minimum cash support for low-
income urban residents) , a national health insurance 
program, and a broader and more redistributive national 
income tax system. 
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Second, there can be an active channel of risk 
sharing, in which the central government provides 
subsidies to regional governments to compensate 
for the negative effects of a crisis. 
 
Chang (2002) warns that an ill-designed transfer 
payment scheme, even if well intended, could in the 
long run worsen rather than improve inequality. 
For example, an aggressive transfer payment 
scheme could tax the modern urban sector and 
then make a transfer payment to the rural peasants. 
Because of the huge size of surplus labor in rural 
areas, tax revenue from the relatively small modern 
urban sector can do little to increase the peasants’ 
income. The tax can, however, damage the growth 
of the modern urban sector, thus dampening the 
economic growth of the entire country and the 
absorption of surplus labor in the long run. In the 
near future, a transfer program of limited scope 
that targets only those who fall below the poverty 
line—that is, people living at the subsistence level—
would be better than a large-scale program aimed 
at reducing nationwide disparity. 
 
Regional Development Strategy 
To reduce regional income inequality and its possi-
ble effects on growth and political stability, China 
might adopt a clear regional development strategy 
that favors the disadvantaged areas. Recent efforts 
to strengthen economic development in the 
western region show that the government has been 
aware of the inequality problem and is now moving 
to tackle this issue. In 2000 the government 
launched the Western Development Strategy (Xibu 
Da Kaifa) to accelerate economic growth and speed 
up the development of the country’s western 
region. In the future, it is important that the coun-
try expand the strategy to cover other lagging 
regions. 
 
Nonstate Enterprises 
As China further integrates with global markets, 
the SOEs face increasing pressure to adjust their 
production structures to China’s comparative 
advantage, which may lead to more layoffs. The 
government could design policies to promote the 
development of private businesses to reduce the 
unemployment rate. Because most of the poor are 
located in lagging western China, where state-
owned industries remain the major providers of 
jobs, the need to speed up development of non-
state enterprises to absorb jobs lost by SOEs is 
even more urgent. Lu (2002) confirms the equity-
enhancing role of the private sector through its 
better resource allocation. He proposes stronger 
fiscal discipline on local governments’ taxation and 
revenue collection to release more resources to 
private hands. In addition, the financial and banking 
sector should be reformed to improve financing 
for private enterprises and to make the allocation 
of investment resources market oriented. 
 
Social Security 
Establishing an effective social security system for 
the potentially vulnerable population in urban and 
rural areas is another policy option deserving atten-
tion. Since China established and improved its 
socialist market economy system in the mid-1980s, 
it has reformed the social security system practiced 
under the planned economy. A basic framework 
for a social security system has been set up corre-
sponding to the market economy system, with the 
central and local governments sharing specific 
responsibilities. According to the white paper 
“China’s Social Security and Its Policy” issued by 
the State Council in 2004, China’s social security 
system now includes social insurance, social welfare, 
a special care and placement system, social relief, 
and housing services. As the core of the social 
security system, social insurance includes old-age 
insurance, unemployment insurance, medical insur-
ance, work-related injury insurance, and maternity 
insurance. The reformed social security system has 
helped to equalize the distribution of unemployed 
and retired household members’ income in urban 
areas. As the paper admitted, however, the benefi-
ciaries of the current system are confined to urban 
areas, and establishing a sound social security 
system for the entire country is an extremely 
arduous task. Currently, social security benefits for 
rural migrants are low, and most of the rural 
population still has limited or no access to the new 
system.   
 
Infrastructure 
The abolition of the old welfare system has caused 
a rapid decrease in in-kind subsidies and a corre-
sponding increase in out-of-pocket expenditures on 
education, health care, and housing for urban resi-
dents. This change makes the urban poor more 
vulnerable to sudden shocks and crises and less 
likely to develop human capital, reducing their 
Income Disparity in China and Its Policy Implications 
Cheng 
 
 
©Cornell University, Ithaca, New York. 
All rights reserved.  This case study may be reproduced for educational purposes without express permission but must include 
acknowledgement to Cornell University. No commercial use is permitted without permission. 
 
12
ability to catch up with the rich. In the long run 
the government should broaden poor people’s 
access to basic education and health care by 
increasing infrastructure investments so that all can 
share the opportunities offered by the economic 
expansion. Building infrastructure is important for 
rural residents as well. Improving rural infrastruc-
ture and promoting rural off-farm activities may 
raise the incomes of rural dwellers and increase 
domestic demand, which could provide a needed 
vent if the extraordinary growth led by foreign 
demand were to fall in the future. 
 
Labor Mobility 
Labor mobility between sectors or regions is 
instrumental in alleviating spatial disparity and 
should therefore be encouraged. The institution 
most frequently blamed for blocking mobility is 
the household registration system, which denies 
rural residents the right to migrate to urban areas. 
Although some restrictions on rural-to-urban 
migration have been relaxed or abandoned in 
recent years, the household registration system has 
been modified only marginally and still plays a 
crucial role in blocking labor mobility between the 
urban and rural areas. Lu (2002) suggests that 
further reforms of the household registration 
system to facilitate rural-urban labor mobility will 
“kill two birds with one stone” by both enhancing 
efficiency and improving equity. 
 
Urbanization  
Because the major cause of income disparity in 
China is the urban-rural income gap, the most 
effective effort the government can make may be 
to accelerate urbanization. Chang (2002) points out 
that China’s urbanization lags substantially behind 
the world standard, and reducing this lag alone can 
help 50 million peasants find jobs in cities, signifi-
cantly reducing the numbers living in rural areas. 
He notes that this change alone might not reduce 
the measured Gini coefficient per se, but it would 
certainly make the country as a whole better off. 
The ultimate cure for the urban-rural income gap is 
absorbing all rural surplus labor in the urban 
modern sector, which is closely linked to the 
reform of the household registration system. 
According to Chang, this process may take more 
than a decade because of the huge number of 
surplus workers in the rural areas. Achieving this 
objective will require that the government promote 
and maintain rapid growth in the urban modern 
sector, and as the urban modern sector expands 
relative to the rural sector, the urban-rural gap may 
continue to widen for a period of time. Therefore, 
to reduce income disparity in the long run, China 
will have to live with a rising income disparity in 
the short run.  
 
Assignment 
 
Your assignment is to make policy recommenda-
tions to the Chinese government to help reduce 
income disparity in this country. 
 
Additional Readings 
 
Benjamin, D., L. Brandt, J. Giles, and S. Wang. 
Forthcoming. Income inequality during China’s 
economic transition. In L. Brandt and T. 
Rawski, eds., China's economic transition: 
Origins, mechanisms, and consequences.  
Riskin, C., R. Zhao, and L. Shi. 2001. China’s retreat 
from equality: Income distribution and eco-
nomic transition. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharp. 
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). 
2005. The state of equity in China: Income and 
wealth distribution. Chapter 2 in China human 
development report. Beijing. 
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